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The Press Versus the GovernlDent: 
The "Right to Know" and First 
AlDendment Jurisprudence 
The first forty-five words ofthe 
Bill of Rights provide a powerful 
protective tool for the American 
press. These mere words are used as 
both a sword and a shield. Known 
as the Free Press Clause,1 the words 
make the press, specifically, and 
publishing, in general, the "only 
organized private business that is 
given explicit constitutional protec-
tion."2 Thus, the American press, 
empowered by this protection, 
should act on behalf ofthe people in 
pursuit of knowledge about what 
the government is doing. The argu-
ment follows, then, that citizens of 
the U.S. have a constitutional "right 
to know" the truth about their 
govemment'sactivitiesthroughtheir 
surrogate watchdog: the press. 
Recently, the press ran afoul of 
the federal government in its at-
tempt to provide full coverage ofthe 
Persian Gulf War. The Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, 
made up of such journalistic lumi-
naries as Bernard Shaw, Bob 
Woodward, Tom Brokaw, Peter 
Jennings, and Dan Rather, issued a 
96-page paper citing at least "235 
[governmental] actions which have 
limited the news media's ability to 
gather and disseminate news."3 The 
news media's legal challenge was 
that reporters should be permitted 
nearly unlimited access to informa-
tion on events occurring in the Gulf. 
Predictably, the committee made 
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little headway. 
Two lawsuits dealing with this 
challenge were filed in federal court, 
only to be shot down like errant scud 
missiles. On January 10, 1991, The 
Nation Magazine v. United States 
Department of Defense4 was filed 
on behalf of The Nation Magazine, 
Mother Jones Magazine, The Vil-
lage Voice, The L.A. Weekly, Pa-
cific News Service, The Texas Ob-
server, and other news organiza-
tions, as well as a number of indi-
vidual journalists. 
On February 6, 1991, the Agence-
France-Presse (AFP), a wire service 
of reporters and photographers serv-
ing 24 million readers in the United 
States, also confronted the "right to 
know" issue by requesting a tempo-
rary restraining order in Agence-
France-Presse v. United States De-
partment of Defense. S Due to the 
similarity ofthe issues involved, the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) 
successfully moved to join the cases. 
Specifically at issue in both of 
the cases was the DOD's "pooling" 
regulations, which limit the media's 
battlefield access to a specified num-
ber of press representatives and sub-
jectthem to certain restrictions. The 
plaintiffs in both cases did not chal-
lenge DOD limitations on informa-
tion that was admittedly proper for 
national security reasons. Rather, 
theplaintiffs questioned whether the 
media should be denied access to 
the arena in which American mili-
tary forces were engaged.6 
The concept of "comb at pools" 
thatwouldconsistofreporters, pho-
tographers, and camera operators 
was created by DOD regulation af-
ter the Vietnam War. The Vietnam 
Conflict era press corps had virtu-
ally unlimited access to military ac-
tivity, which enabled" American au-
diences to observe events daily, in-
cluding casualties and deaths in vivid 
and often painful detail.'" 
In the post-Vietnam Conflict era, 
the press worked under DOD pool-
ing regulations in some form, spe-
cifically, during the Grenada and 
Panama military operations. The 
pools were permitted to go only 
where assigned and were always 
under the control of authorized mili-
tary escort officers. These officers 
had the authority, through an instant 
"security review,"to stop interviews 
or photography at any time they 
deemed a potential security risk may 
have existed.8 
The press pool regulations in 
effect during the Persian Gulf War 
were similar to the regulations in 
effect during previous military op-
erations. The regulations remained 
in effect until they were formally 
lifted by the DOD on March 4, 
1991. Oral argument was heard in 
the consolidated The Nation Maga-
zine! Agence-France-Pressecase on 
March 7, 1991. 
The press argued that the DOD 
pooling regulations infringed upon 
the news-gathering privileges af-
fordedbytheFirstAmendment The 
DOD insisted that the federal court 
dismiss the complaint without reach-
ing the merits of the argument be-
cause, among other things, the con-
troversy was moot and, therefore, 
non-justiciable. In support of this 
contention, the DOD pointed to the 
fact that the regulations had been 
lifted and, as a result, the contro-
versy no longer existed.9 
Judge Leonard B. Sand, in a 
precisely crafted opinion, acknowl-
edged the DOD's argument that the 
pooling regulations, having been 
lifted, left no formal controversy 
before the court. However, the Judge 
considered whether this situation 
was an ongoing controversy so as to 
make the plaintiffs' challenge "ca-
pable of repetition, yet evading re-
view."lo To decide the issue, the 
court took note of the evolutionary 
history of the DOD regulations. 
After the Grenada and Panama 
military operations, the DOD had 
changed the regulations. The DOD 
pointed out that such revisions were 
on-going to the regulations, and to 
the extent the DOD deemed appro-
priate, changes would be made in 
accordance with suggestions offered 
by the press. II 
Judge Sand, therefore, thought it 
was inappropriate to grant the press 
injunctive or declaratory relief based 
upon language in the regulations 
that may be different if, and when, 
another military operation takes 
place. "The possibility ofrepetition 
may not occur .... [R]epetition may 
always be avoided by revision of the 
challenged conduct." 12 As a result, 
Judge Sand dismissed both lawsuits 
as moot on April 16, 1991, holding 
that "[p ]rudence dictates that a final 
determination ofthe important con-
stitutional issues at stake be left for 
another day when the controversy is 
more sharply focused."13 
In Flynt v. Weinberger,14 Larry 
Flynt of Hustler magazine fame filed 
suit against Caspar Weinberger in-
dividually and in his capacity as 
Secretary of Defense in the Reagan 
Administration, because of the 
policy prohibiting representatives 
ofthe press from accompanying the 
invasion forces during the U.S. in-
tervention in Grenada. Members of 
the press, who managed to make 
their own way to the island, were 
prevented from reporting news of 
the invasion due to a military-im-
posed news blackout. Official U.S. 
"The press argued 
that the DOD pool-
ing regulations in-
fringed upon the 
news-gatheringprivi-
leges afforded by the 
First Amendment. " 
government sources issued the only 
information available to the public 
about the events occurring in 
Grenada. IS 
On October 27, 1983, two days 
after the invasion, the press ban was 
lifted and a limited number ofpress 
representatives were permitted ac-
cess to the island, subject to similar 
pooling requirements imposed in 
the recent Persian Gulf War. The 
civilian airport at Grenada was 
opened on November 7, 1983, and 
press travel restrictions and pool 
censorship were eliminated by the 
DOD.16 
The press in the Grenada case 
sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief from the initial press ban, but 
unlike the press in the Persian Gulf 
situation, did not challenge the DOD 
press pool regulations. 11 Specifi-
cally, the press wanted an injunc-
tion to prohibit the military from 
"preventing or otherwise hindering 
Plaintiffs from sending reporters to 
the sovereign nation of Grenada to 
gather news ... " and a declaration 
that "the course of conduct engaged 
in by Defendants, ... in preventing 
Plaintiffs, or otherwise hindering 
Plaintiffs' efforts to send reporters 
to the sovereign nation of Grenada 
for the purpose of gathering news is 
in violation of the Constitution [sic] 
laws, and treaties of the United 
States .... "18 
The Federal District Court for 
the District of Columbia dismissed 
the request for an injunction as moot 
because, at the time of trial, the 
press had unlimited access to 
Grenada. On the question of de-
claratory relief, the court was re-
quired to look closely at the facts 
and apply the technical requirements 
of the mootness doctrine. 
Without mentioning the weighty 
notion of whether the public via the 
press had a right to know the activi-
ties of the military in the Grenada 
situation, the court stated that the 
press had to prove b..Q!h aspects of 
the exception to the mootness doc-
trine in order to have its case heard 
by the court. The exceptions to 
having a case dismissed due to 
mootness occur when (1) the con-
troversy is capable of repetition, yet 
evades review,19 and (2) the defen-
dant voluntarily ceases the chal-
lenged activity.20 
The court reasoned that because 
there was no expectation that the 
controversy would recur, the situa-
tion did not fall within the excep-
tion. "The invasion of Grenada 
was, like any invasion or military 
intervention, a unique event. Its 
occurrence required a combination 
of geopolitical circumstances not 
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likely to be repeated."21 
Although it was unnecessary to 
express an opinion on the second 
exception, the court nevertheless 
stated that the challenged activity 
was voluntarily tenninated by the 
government when the military lifted 
the news blackout. Also, the court 
observed that the ban on news cov-
erage was contingent upon the exer-
cise of executive discretion, and, 
therefore, was not a "fixed and defi-
nite" government policy.22 Under 
this rationale, the policy could be 
altered in the event of future mili-
tary conflicts. This dkta foreshad-
owed Judge Sand's opinion in the 
Persian Gulf case. 
The press in Flynt appealed the 
district court's dismissal of its case 
with prejudice. The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld 
the district court's dismissal for 
mootness, but vacated that court's 
opinion because it "improperly con-
sidered and offered judgments on 
the underlying merits of the dis-
pute."23 In vacating the opinion, the 
appellate court left open an avenue 
for the press to amend its complaint 
and continue to challenge limita-
tions on press access in the Grenada 
intervention; however, no further 
challenge was made. 
As a matter of history, and as 
these cases point out, the press has 
not been held in high regard by the 
military in general. 24 William 
Tecumseh Shennan once said ofthe 
press that they were "a dirty set of 
scribblers who have the impudence 
of Satan."25 Although the courts 
have not resolved the issue of 
whether the public has a "right to 
know" in these situations, the notion 
that the press has the right and/or the 
responsibility to ferret out infonna-
tion and provide it to the American 
people seems ripe for discussion. 
Although the First Amendment 
does not contain the phrase "right to 
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know," many understand it to be a 
logical consequence of constitution-
ally mandated press freedom. For 
example, while the first Amend-
ment prohibits the gove'rnment from 
creating a law orrule that'~'abridge[ s] 
the freedom of speech" for the gen-
eral population, it does not stop 
there. The Amendment explicitly 
states that the government is pre-
vented from making a rule that pro-
hibits the press' freedom. 
The pertinent section of the First 
Amendment states as follows: "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the 
press .... " (emphasis added). Due 
to the Amendment's structure, it is 
only logical that the Free Press 
"[IJtwould make little 
sense to grant the 
press the freedom of 
publishing facts 
without granting 
the symbiotic freedom 
to investigate matters 
" •••• 
Clause must contain additional pro-
tection to the freedom of speech 
already granted to the general popu-
lation, lest it be a mere constitu-
tional redundancy. 26 Furthermore, 
such a redundancy would not be 
consistent with the Framers' obvi-
ous care in creating the document. 
Moreover, it would make little 
sense to grant the press the freedom 
of publishing facts without granting 
the symbiotic freedom to investi-
gate matters and detennine which 
facts to publish. Properly employed, 
the "right to know" theory protects 
this symbiotic relationship. 
As a "reporter" of human events, 
the journalist should be bound to a 
multiplicity of ideas that comprise 
his or her ''belief system" or "pro-
fessional ideology."27 These ideas 
include the dedication to social re-
sponsibility,28 the search for truth,29 
objectivity,30 enlightened skepti-
cism/I the public's right to know,32 
and the view that journalism can be 
an instrument of public education.33 
In Aristotelian tenns, the "good" 
stemming from the "right to know" 
is knowledge. Our constitutional 
fonn of government is modeled upon 
the premise that to be enlightened 
with knowledge is a "good thing." 
For example, our due process guar-
antee in criminal law provides an 
accused individual with the right to 
know the nature and cause of the 
charges34 and the names of the wit-
nesses making the accusation. 35 
Thus, the Constitution gives cre-
dence to the notion that the "right to 
know" is a good thing. 
James Madison set out the fun-
damental importance of such knowl-
edge long ago: 
A popular government, 
without popular infonna-
tion or the means of acquir-
ing it, is but a prologue to a 
farce or a tragedy; or per-
haps both. Knowledge will 
forever govern ignorance. 
And a people who mean to 
be their own governors, 
must ann themselves with 
the power knowledge 
gives.36 
In the context of most recent First 
Amendment jurisprudence, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that the 
rights ofthe viewers and listeners of 
mass media are paramount. 37 In a 
case invo lving pornography, the S u-
preme Court upheld an individual's 
constitutional right to possess such 
material in the privacy of the home 
and announced that "[i]t is now well 
established that the Constitution 
protects the right to receive infor-
mation and ideas."38 In another 
case, the Court reasoned that con-
sumers have a right to know price 
information on prescriptions from 
their pharmacists.39 
Moreover, there is an explicit 
assumption, even on the part of the 
government, that the American 
people have the right to know at 
least some of the activities of its 
government. This is evidenced by 
the Freedom of Information Act, 
state reporter shield laws, and sun-
shine statutes.40 However, the Su-
preme Court has also held, in some 
cases directly and in others by im-
plication, ''that riders on public buses 
have no right to receive [political] 
campaign ads; that on certain high-
ways the occupants of automobiles 
have no right to receive billboard 
ads; that television viewers have no 
right to receive advertising for ciga-
rettes; that the public has no abso-
lute right to receive messages via 
sound truck, or in privately owned 
shopping malIs."4! 
Thus, while the public's right to 
know has not been legally granted 
an unqualified stamp of approval, 
the imprint of the right to know 
nevertheless exists in our society, 
albeit at some undefined level. As 
one observernoted, ''the contours of 
the right to know remain obscure. "42 
To paraphrase James Madison, 
our government is not worth a 
plugged nickel without the proper 
tools to acquire information about 
the activities of the government and 
disseminate it to the real governors: 
the people. The press argue that it is 
uniquely chosen by the Framers to 
accomplish this objective, as evi-
denced by the protection granted by 
the Free Press Clause. The question 
that has now been posed in the after-
math of the Persian Gulf War is 
whether the press can successfully 
challenge the rules promulgated by 
the U.S. Department of Defense 
using the ethereal concept of the 
public's right to know as the "pry 
bar" to permit media access. 
It has been observed that the 
spirit of the First Amendment and 
the method in which it has been 
interpreted make the public's right 
to know "an integral part of the 
system offreedom of expression."43 
This concept is arguably "entitled to 
support by legislation or other affir-
mative government action."44 
It is likely, however, that the 
most that will be offered to those 
who champion the right to know is 
simply the key to the courthouse 
door. The amorphous nature of the 
beast defies any realistic articula-
tion of legal standards. As former 
Supreme Court Justice Potter 
Stewart observed: "The Constitu-
tion establishes the contest, not its 
resolution."4s Such clashes, he notes, 
are part of the woof and warp of a 
constitutional system that accom-
modates both the iron rigidity ofthe 
rule of law as well as the human 
nature ofindividuals who must live 
by that law.46 
The public's right to know, de-
rived from a generous reading ofthe 
Free Press Clause, creates the requi-
site standing for the press to chal-
lenge our government, but it does 
not appear to guarantee victory. 
Justice Stewart said that the Consti-
tution itself "is not [a] Freedom of 
Information Act, [nor is it] an Offi-
cial Secrets Act."47 
At any rate, a fundamental ques-
tion of First Amendment jurispru-
dence remains unanswered. Spe-
cifically, to what extent may the 
United States government restrict 
access by the press to a military 
operation, if the notion is accepted 
that the press acts as surrogate for 
the people? Based upon the case 
law, it is unlikely that the press can 
overcome the military's motion to 
dismiss on the grounds of moot ness. 
It appears that the Defense Depart-
ment need only argue that the pool-
ing regulations are subject to ongo-
ing revision and, as such, they will 
not be the same in a subsequent 
conflict. 
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